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DABSTRACT
This thesis examines the estimated effects on enlisted retention in the Marine
Corps of changing the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) payment method to lump
sum. The thesis surveys the literature on personal discount rates (PDR) and on models of
enlisted retention. The thesis analyzes the potential effect of the payment method on
retention of Zone A eligible personnel using a range of PDRs and retention elasticities
estimated by the Center for Naval Analyses. The NPV of a lump sum payment was
compared to that of the current payment method using the actual SRB multiples for each
USMC Occupational Field. The results indicate Zone A first-term Marine retention will
increase between 6.8 percent and 11.7 percent if the SRB payment were made in lump
sum. The effect of switching to a lump sum payment was also analyzed using the
Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model. The ACOL model estimates reinforced the
estimates predicted by this thesis. Finally, a Monte Carlo simulation was run in
Microsoft Excel to estimate the probabilities of attaining a given number of Marines
across all Occupational Fields. The Monte Carlo simulation runs show an increased
probability of obtaining a given number of first-term Marines by changing the SRB
payment method to lump sum.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this research is to analyze the effects of changing the Marine
Corps' Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) to a lump sum payment method. The goal is
to research personal discount rates (PDRs) and Marine occupational field labor supply
(retention) elasticities to gain a better understanding of the implications of implementing
the proposed lump sum payment. The primary goal is to predict the increase in retention
that would result from implementing the new payment system. In addition, this research
aims to assess the likely range in predicted retention behavior based on different
assumptions about key parameters. Finally, the research aims to analyze the costs and
benefits of changing the payment method to lump sum as well as an understanding of the
key factors that affect the impact of the proposed SRB payment method change.
B. PROBLEM
In recent years, the viability of the All Volunteer Force (AVF), which was born in
1974, has become a topic of much discussion both inside and outside of the Capital
beltway. The economy of the late 1990's has performed remarkably well, unemployment
rates remain low, and recruiting young men and women has become harder than ever
before. At the same time, the military's requirement for highly educated personnel has
increased in direct proportion to the increase in warfighting technology. Another
complicating factor for the AVF is the growth in the number of young adults who are
aspiring to obtain a college degree, which further reduces the military's recruiting market.
These factors (and others) have contributed not only to several of the military
Services missing their recruiting goal, but also to the feeling among military personnel
planners that the ability to man the "career force" beyond the first-term is reaching a
critical point. The robust economy has worsened military retention as well as entry-level
recruiting. When confronted with the cause of their manpower problem, military
personnel experts have examined internal factors such as leadership, operational tempo,
and work hours as long-term solutions to the career force manning problem. Although
the Department of Defense has been aware of and taken action towards reducing the
military's recruiting and retention problems for over six years, the military is still facing
very real recruiting and retention problems as we enter the 21 st Century.
In an August 1999 survey report, the Government Accounting Office stated that:
"Dissatisfaction and intentions to leave the military were more apparent among enlisted
personnel than officers. On average, 52 percent of enlisted personnel surveyed said they
were dissatisfied with the military, whereas 46 percent of officers were dissatisfied.
Similarly, 62 percent of enlisted personnel surveyed said that they intend to leave the
military after their current obligation is up, whereas 40 percent of officers said they
intend to leave." [Ref 1: p 2]
More recently, Marine Administrative Message 030/00 announced the following:
"Our progress to date indicates reenlistment rates for Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 (actual
reenlistments executed) do not compare favorably with those for the same period in FY
1999. Reenlistments authorized in FY 2000 have increased by 13 percentage points.
Reenlistment execution rates have decreased by 12 percentage points. Fifty-five percent
of all FY 2000 boatspaces have been executed, and 2,375 boatspaces remain. At this
same time last year, sixty-seven percent of all FY 1999 boatspaces had been executed,
and only 1,556 boatspaces remained. Thirty-seven Marine Occupation Specialties
(MOS) have closed, as compared with 52 MOSs during the same period in FY 1999."
[Ref 2: p 1] In short, retention has suffered.
In an "up or out" manpower system, retention problems today can have a "ripple"
effect in future years as billets in higher pay grades and experience cells go unfilled. The
focus of this thesis will be on one of the primary short-term retention "tools" available to
Marine Corps manpower planners to reduce the enlisted retention challenges of the 21 st
Century; the Zone A Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program.
C. BACKGROUND /HISTORY OF SRB PAYMENT PLAN
A short-term (in the trenches) tool used by military manpower planners to alter
retention behavior focuses on the monetary aspects of retention. "Other things being
equal, larger bonuses or higher levels of military pay relative to civilian pay are
associated with higher enlistment rates." [Ref 3: p 6] One of the major tools used by
military manpower planners to retain and shape the enlisted career force is the Selective
Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program.
The current SRB program can be traced to 1965, when the services began to
experience increasing problems in first-term retention and career manning in a number of
technical skills with high training costs. As a result, Congress established the Variable
Reenlistment Bonus program in 1965. [Ref 4: p 2] In 1974, Congress, in Title 37,
Section 308 of the United States Code authorized the Selective Reenlistment Program to
replace the Variable Reenlistment program.
Prior to April 1979, reenlistment bonuses were paid in annual installments over
the individual's reenlistment period. Beginning on 1 April 1979, however, the entire
bonus was paid in a lump sum at the date of reenlistment, though the undiscounted value
of the bonus remained the same for reenlistments of the same length. [Ref 5: p 1] The
lump sum payment increased the net present value (NPV) of the bonus to the service
members receiving it.
Starting in February 1982 through the time of this writing (Spring 2000), the SRB
payment method was changed such that half of the bonus award is paid in a lump sum at
the time of reenlistment with the remainder of the contract amount being paid in equal
installments on the reenlistment-contract anniversary date. [Ref 6: p AI 7] The intent of
the SRB program today remains similar to its original purpose, "To influence personnel
inventories in specific situations in which less costly methods have proven inadequate or
impractical." [Ref 7: p 2]
At the time of this writing, SRBs are authorized in section 4.3.3.1 of the
Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 1304.21 to be paid using a lump sum payment
method. However, section 8021 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 budget specifically states
that, "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds appropriated by this
Act shall be available to pay more than 50 per centum of an amount paid to any person
under section 308 of title 37, United States Code, in a lump sum."
SRBs are used at three control points in an enlisted Marine's career. The first
control point is Zone A which occurs after the Marine has completed his first enlistment
obligation. Currently there are several different lengths of initial service contracts
reaching their first reenlistment point; however, almost all new Marine Corps enlistment
contracts currently are for a four year duration.
The Marine Corps has three control points (or zones) to which Marines are
eligible to be paid a reenlistment bonus. They are Zone A (reenlistments executed
between 21 months and 6 years of continuous service), Zone B (reenlistments executed
between 6 and 10 years of continuous service) and Zone C (reenlistments executed
between 10 and 14 years of continuous service). Because of the constraints imposed on
the military manpower structure of "growing their own" (no lateral transfer into the
ranks), the most critical reenlistment point for the Marine Corps career force planners is
the Zone A reenlistment point.
Marines cannot receive more than one SRB in either Zone A, B, or C, limiting
them to a maximum of three possible SRB opportunities (if their Occupational Specialty
was eligible for the SRB at points of time when the Marine was in Zone A, B, and C).
The SRB is also "capped" by Marine Corps Order (MCO) 7220.24M (7 May 1990), so as
to not exceed $45,000 for any one zone. Marine Corps policy, however, caps bonus
payments at $30,000 for Zone A payments and $20,000 for Zone B and C payments.
[Ref8]
Under the current SRB structure 50 percent of the SRB is paid in the first year
with the remaining 50 percent distributed evenly over the remaining reenlistment contract
period. Young men and women (especially those who join the military) have been
observed to have very high personal discount rates (PDR). A personal discount rate
represents an individual's preferences for having money today vice waiting for a future
date to obtain an even larger amount of money. Estimates of PDRs today for most youth
range in the 16 to 30 percent range, which means they would be indifferent to the choice
of having $1,000 today vice $1,160 to $1,220 a year from today (depending upon which
PDR is used).
With such seemingly high PDRs expressed by our junior enlisted, changing the
SRB pay out method from its current state to one of a lump-sum method has the potential
to increase the value that Zone A personnel place on the SRB. This increased value has
the potential to increase reenlistment rates using the same amount of budgetary dollars
(or to achieve the same reenlistment rate for a lower budgetary expenditure).
There are, however, several problems with determining the magnitude of the
effect of the "lump sum SRB" system. Among these are the uncertainties surrounding
the "correct" PDR rate to use to determine the net present value of the SRB and the
uncertainties surrounding the occupational field retention elasticities for a given amount
of SRB. This uncertainty was expressed by the current Marine Corps' SRB planner
(Major Cheryl Fitzgerald), and by Dr. Aline Quester (CNA analyst) to the author. That
is, we don't know for certain the value that enlistees place on future dollars, nor the effect
of a dollar's worth of SRB payments on retention decisions.
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The scope of this thesis will include an intense literature review to determine the
range of PDRs and retention elasticities (by occupational field) that have been estimated
by prior research. Second, these estimates will be used to compute the change in the net
present value of a lump sum SRB payment plan versus the current payment method. This
literature review will also include a historical perspective of the pros and cons of going to
a lump sum SRB payment plan. It will include a sensitivity analysis using best "point"
estimates to determine if the Marine Corps can increase retention rates by using the same
amounts of budgeted SRB funds.
Finally, using a Microsoft Excel based computer program called Insight.XLA,
this thesis will analyze the results of a Monte Carlo simulation run using a "range" of
PDRs and a "range" of labor supply elasticities on Marine occupational (skill) fields.
Due to time constraints, this model will be used specifically for processing data for
analysis by this thesis. It is a fairly "user friendly" model but will require additional
work to allow an unfamiliar "user" to operate it. With minimal training, the current
model could be used by the Marine Corps' Career Planner(s) to get a better understanding
of "predicted" reenlistment rates and the "uncertainties" surrounding these forecasts.
This thesis will focus solely on Zone A reenlistments and will not investigate SRB policy
change impacts on Zones B or C.
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Question
The primary research question that this thesis will address is: What is a
reasonable forecast for the change in first term retention levels as a result of changing the
SRB payment method to lump sum?
2. Subsidiary Questions
The subsidiary research questions are as follows:
• What is an applicable personal discount rate (point estimate and range of
estimates) for an enlisted Marine reaching his/her zone A reenlistment point?
• What is an applicable SRB military labor supply elasticity at the first-term
reenlistment point?
• What are the costs and benefits of changing the USMC SRB payment method
policy from the current 50 percent first year plan to a lump sum first year
plan?
• What are the results of a sensitivity analysis performed on changing the SRB
payment from the current method of paying 50 percent up front to a policy of
100 percent lump sum payment?
• What are the insights realized by running Monte Carlo Simulations (by
"selected occupational fields) with alternative PDR's and alternative labor
supply (retention) elasticities on a proposed lump sum SRB payment method?
F. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in this thesis research consists of the following steps: (1) a
literature search of books, magazine articles, CD-ROM systems, and other library
information resources; (2) interviews with personnel from MPP-20, The Center for
Naval Analysis (CNA), and other retention experts; (3) a "sensitivity analysis" of the
retention effects of changing the SRB payment method from its current payment plan to a
lump sum payment plan using the most reasonable "point" estimates for PDRs and
USMC occupational field labor supply elasticities; (4) a Microsoft Excel model using
the computer program INSIGHT.XLA to run a Monte Carlo simulation on a "range" of
most likely PDRs and occupational field labor supply elasticities to determine the
retention effects of changing the SRB payment method; and (5) a simulation of the
effect of switching to a lump sum payment method on reenlistment in Navy ratings using
the Navy's ACOL reenlistment model and compare this to "selected" Marine Corps
Occupational Fields.
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter I. Introduction. Identifies the focus and purpose of the thesis and states
the primary and subsidiary research questions.
Chapter II. The Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model. This chapter
provides an overview of one of the most respected and widely used manpower models
used to predict "stay or leave" behavior by military personnel.
Chapter III. The Time Value of Money. This chapter provides an overview of
determining Net Present Value and how Personal Discount Rates (PDR) can vary
between individuals.
Chapter IV. Estimates of Effect of Lump Sum SRB on Reenlistment Rates This
chapter outlines the methodology this thesis uses in determining the effects of PDRs and
their effects on retention. This chapter will also perform a sensitivity analysis using the
ACOL model on selected "similar" Navy Occupational Fields and compare the results.
Chapter V. Monte Carlo Simulation of PDRs and USMC Retention Elasticities.
This chapter describes the methodology used in performing the Monte Carlo simulation
on "selected" Marine Occupational fields and reports the Monte Carlo simulation results.
Chapter VI. Conclusions and Recommendations. The final chapter summarizes
the findings of the research, summarizes the lessons learned, provides recommendations
from this study, and provides recommendations for future research.
H. BENEFITS OF STUDY
This study will provide the necessary information required to make a sound
decision by the USMC and other policy decision makers as to the possible
implementation of a change in its policy of paying out the SRB. This study will provide
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the USMC with additional insight into the costs and benefits of going to a lump sum SRB
payment method.
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II. THE ANNUALIZED COST OF LEAVING (ACOL) MODEL
A. BASIC ACOL THEORY
The Annualized Cost Of Leaving (ACOL) model was first developed by Dr. John
T. Warner and Gary Nelson to analyze potential changes to the military retirement
system. [Ref 9: p 6] Prior to this time, the Navy planned retention and enlistment
estimates based on historical data. This "historical based" system did not lend itself to
having a lot of precision during time periods of rapidly changing economic environments.
The theory behind the ACOL model is that service members make their
separation decision based on the "utility" they will derive from their "stay" or "leave"
choice. "Positive economics" is a theory in which people are assumed to seek out
"benefits" while minimizing "costs". [Ref 10: p 3] One assumption of positive economic
theory is that people behave and make decisions rationally. "When considering persons,
economists assume that the objective being pursued is utility maximization; that is, people
are assumed to strive toward the goal of making themselves as happy as they can (given
their limited resources). Utility, of course, encompasses both pecuniary and
nonpecuniary dimensions." [Ref 10: p 4] Pecuniary refers almost entirely to "money or
salary" while nonpecuniary refers to other aspects of a person's life (job satisfaction,
work environment, free time, job demands, etc.).
The individual then strives to maximize his/her utility or the total "satisfaction"
derived from the economic and life situations they are in. If a service member has the
potential to increase his/her utility by leaving the service, he/she will pursue an
occupation in the civilian labor market and will experience more "happiness" in his/her
life by making this decision. If a service member feels they will decrease their utility by
11
leaving the service they will stay in the military and they will experience more
"happiness" in their lives due to this decision.
The ACOL model encompasses positive economic theory by encompassing all
aspects of the "stay or leave" decision. It not only captures expected future income
streams but also attempts to assign equivalent monetary values to the nonpecuniary
aspects of making a career out of the military. The ACOL model looks at a person's
potential income streams and the value of nonpecuniary factors (such as a preference for
military life or a distaste for military life) and discounts them back to current dollars to
determine a value for staying in the military or for leaving the military and pursuing a job
in the civilian labor sector. The cost-of-leaving is the difference between the value of the
civilian option and the military option (in dollar amounts). If the ACOL (cost-of-leaving)
is positive, the individual will choose to stay in the military; if the value is negative, the
individual will leave the military service.
One critical aspect of the ACOL model is the derivation of the time horizon to use
in its computation. The model can be used for any time horizon; however, a positive
ACOL value for any time horizon predicts the individual will be better off "staying in" at
the present time. The ACOL model is a very complex computation as it takes into
account many variables (to be discussed later) and places a dollar value or net (positive or
negative) effect on each. Two critical aspects of the ACOL model are the determination
of the "discount rate" when determining the net present value of the cost of leaving and
the determination of the maximum length "time horizon" to use. These factors will be
discussed later in this chapter.
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B. ACOL VARIABLES
When deciding upon whether to stay in or get out of the military as a job career,
"One searches over all possible lengths of stay to determine the optimal length of stay at
a given decision point. The financial returns associated with the optimal length of stay
are then compared with the financial incentive of leaving immediately. The ACOL value
is the net financial incentive to stay if positive or leave if negative. It is calculated as the
annualized difference in the financial rewards from staying to the optimal leaving point
relative to leaving immediately." [Ref 1 1: p 129]
There are many variations of the ACOL model; however, the basic approach
involves developing income and preference streams for military and civilian lifestyles,
discounting them into today's net present value (NPV), and subtracting the civilian NPV
from the military NPV. The decision criterion of the ACOL model is based on the
following: Let A(t,n) be the ACOL value for someone at time t thinking about staying n
more years or leaving today. The ACOL value is the difference between the annualized
pay stream from remaining n more years and the annualized pay stream if the service-
member leaves the military now. Let A(t) = max (A(t,t+1), A(t,t+2), ...,A(t,N)) where N
is the maximum possible career length of service. The individual will stay in the
military if A(t) (the ACOL value) is greater than 0; he/she will leave the military if A(t)
is negative. However, the above is true only for "taste-neutral" individuals. If an
individual really enjoys the military lifestyle, he/she may obtain more utility by staying in
the military. Likewise, if the individual abhors the military lifestyle, he/she may obtain
more utility by choosing a civilian lifestyle even if the pay is not as attractive as his/her
current military pay. [Ref 12]
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Chapter 13 of the Handbook of Defense Economics . Volume 1, 1995 by John
Warner and Beth Asch, presents a general mathematical explanation of the ACOL model.
[Ref 13: p 360] The variables below apply to an individual rationalizing the decision to
stay in or get out of the military at the present time. The following are a list of variables




= the expected military pay in each future yeary*
Wft = expected civilian earnings in future yeary if the individual leaves at time t
Wfn - expected civilian earnings in future yeary if the individual separates after
future year n
R„ = expected present value at future year n of retired pay and other separation
benefits if the individual separates after year n
Rt = expected present value at year t of retired pay and other separation benefits
if the person leaves now
t"
1
= preference for the military lifestyle
T
c
= preference for the civilian lifestyle
p = the individual's subjective discount rate on future income
S,,„ = the present value of the future benefit from staying from period t to period
n
Lr = The value of leaving immediately
Ct
,
n = The cost of leaving
ACOL calculates the present value of the future benefit from staying in from
period t through period n (S t,n) as-
Equation 1.
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The value of leaving immediately is:
L=\ — r-+R, Equations
j=n+\
The Annualized Cost of Leaving therefore is S, „ - L,. If the value is positive for
any time horizon, the model predicts the service member will choose to stay in the
military. If the calculated value is negative, the model predicts the service member will
choose to leave military service (assuming military/civilian "taste-neutral" individuals).
C. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ACOL
The primary advantage of the ACOL model is that it fully incorporates all aspects
of the service member's decision to stay in or leave the military. It is by far the most
"encompassing" manpower model to date. Observed characteristics and unobserved
characteristics of the "stay" or "leave" decision are all taken into account. The ACOL
model also does not focus on just one time frame but encompasses many future time
horizons over which the individual may be making his/her decision.
One of the major disadvantages of the ACOL model is the amount of data that
must be acquired to output accurate retention forecasts. Quester and Adedeji note, "The
main difficulty with the ACOL methodology is that it has been difficult to update (or
predict) these expected pay streams accurately." [Ref 3: p 8] From the Marine Corps'
perspective, switching to the ACOL model would take considerable reprogramming
efforts; however, the data needed to run the ACOL model for Marine Corps Occupational
Fields is available.
15
Another weakness with the ACOL model is the time horizon used in the
calculation. The ACOL model uses many different time periods in computing the "stay
or leave" decision. However, the longest time period used normally takes the service
member to the 20 years of service (YOS) mark at which time he/she is "cliff vested into
the military's retirement system. This makes sense in that the retirement figures are
fairly stable (known) and the retirement benefit may have a significant impact on
decisions to stay or leave military service. However, with any forecasting model, the
further out the forecast goes, the less accurate the results may become. The ACOL model
makes sense in maximizing the time horizon at the 20 YOS mark because of the great
uncertainties associated with longer forecast periods. However, the weakness associated
with this technique is that it may ignore an individual's "lifetime" preferences (utility)
when only taking the military service member to between 38 and 42 years of age in its
computation. In other words, ACOL may predict a positive "cost-of-leaving" value
somewhere in the service member's time horizon to the 20 years-of-service point.
However, the possibility exists that had a 40 or 50 year time horizon been used, the
model may predict only negative cost-of-leaving values throughout the specified time
period (which would indicate more "utility" in the civilian market). Factors such as
increased 40IK savings (time horizon minimum of 59 Vi years of age), more family
stability, community work, etc. may sway a service member's decision, but may occur
after the service member's 20 YOS mark.
D. HOW THE SRB FITS INTO ACOL
The Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) is incorporated into the ACOL model
via WM , the expected military pay in each future year (see Equation 1 above). Although
16
it is only one aspect of the ACOL model, the SRB increases the cost-of-leaving. As in
any decision among individuals associated with a group, many military members will be
on the margin about staying in the military. The SRB payment will turn some negative
ACOL values into positive ones and thus induce more military personnel to choose the
stay option.
Under the current SRB payment method, the ACOL model, half of the SRB will
contribute to the discounted value of the military pay in t = with the rest of the SRB
payment contributing in time period 1, 2, and 3. Under the proposed lump sum SRB
payment method, all of the SRB would impact military pay in t = 0. Thus, the ACOL
model predicts that a change to the lump sum payment method will increase military
personnel retention because the NPV of a given SRB bonus will be greater under the
lump sum method. The higher the personal discount rate used, the more effective the
lump sum payment method will be in the ACOL model. We will examine the effects of
the proposed payment change using the ACOL model in Chapter IV. We would expect
the overall ACOL value to increase when the SRB payment method is changed to lump
sum (holding everything else constant). Individual personal discount rates (PDR) will be
discussed in the next chapter.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has identified the Annualized Cost of Leaving model and the
variables it uses. The ACOL model is the most comprehensive manpower retention
model available today and is the military manpower planner's model of choice.
However, ACOL has the disadvantages of requiring large amounts of input data and a
somewhat "fixed" maximum time horizon. The SRB fits nicely into the military
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compensation portion of the ACOL model and is just one input to the ACOL which
encourages greater retention numbers.
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HI. THE TIME VALUE OF MONEY
A. THE CONCEPT OF NET PRESENT VALUE (NPV)
Net present value (NPV) is a financial concept that enables decision-makers to
decide which alternative action will make them "better off. This "decision" could apply
to many different "levels" of decision making, from a decision to start up a new company
by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of an existing company to a decision by a junior
enlisted service member to pay cash or charge his/her groceries at the commissary.
Although the CEO's decision will most likely be more thought out and involve many
reports and detailed analysis, the decision by the junior enlisted service member will also
incorporate the "time value of money" in its making.
"Net present value is computed by assigning monetary values to benefits and
costs, discounting future benefits and costs using an appropriate discount rate, and
subtracting the sum total of discounted costs from the sum total of discounted benefits."
[Ref 14: p 3] By discounting "gains" and "losses" which may occur in future time
periods back to the present period, policy makers have an easy, single "unit of
measurement" to use when making a decision today. The greatest monetary value of an
alternative decision is not always the best route to follow because other factors (such as
personal preferences, needs of society, desire for certain outcome) also may play a role in
the decision.
Of key importance is the discount "rate" used by a decision-maker when
determining a NPV. If one values current consumption far greater than future
consumption, he/she will use a high discount rate which will greatly reduce the NPV of
expected future pay streams. If one values future consumption more than current
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consumption, he/she will use a very low discount rate which will cause the NPV of a
given future pay stream to be higher.
Net present value is calculated first by determining what the future pay streams
will be, when they will occur, and how long they will occur for. Using the current
payment method of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) as an example, a service
member knows what his/her future payments will be and when they will be made. Using
an SRB amount of $10,000, the service member will receive $5,000 today (t = 0), $1,667
($5,000 divided by the three remaining anniversary dates of his/her contract) in one year
(t = 1), $1,667 in year two (t = 2), and $1,667 in year three (t = 3) for a total payment of
$10,000. The service member's "value" of this payment, however, would not be $10,000
but something less than this amount depending on his/her preference for current
consumption. If the service member adopted a personal discount rate "r" of 21 percent,
the NPV of the SRB contract would drop to $8,457 (see equation 3 below).







If this payment were made in a lump sum up front at the reenlistment point the NPV of
the SRB contract would be the full $10,000. Thus, the "choice" of the personal discount
rate can have enormous effects on the determination of the NPV. This will be addressed
in the next section.
B. THE CONCEPT OF PERSONAL DISCOUNT RATE (PDR)
"The discount rate is a measure of time preference, risk, and expectation of future
inflation which is affected by age, sex, race, and level of education." [Ref 15: p 2] The
personal discount rate (PDR) is the rate at which "individuals" trade current for future
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dollars. [Ref 16: p 1] The personal discount rate is defined in classical economic theory
as "the marginal rate of substituting between consumption in the current period and
consumption in the future period along a ray of equal consumption in the two periods."
[Ref 16: p 4] Nord and Schmitz define the annual real PDR of an individual as "the rate
of interest that will make the individual indifferent between a payment ofX dollars at
time t and a secured promise of a payment ofX dollars plus accumulated interest at some
future time t + k." [Ref 17: p 2]
The individual's PDR can be calculated in nominal terms or real terms. The
nominal PDR is a discount rate which does not account for the individual's "expected"
rate of inflation. The real PDR adjusts for the rate of inflation by reducing the nominal
PDR to account for the expected inflation. The real discount rate basically equals the real
discount rate minus the expected rate of inflation. For instance, if the expected rate of
inflation were 3 percent and an individual's nominal PDR was 10 percent, his/her real
PDR would be 7 percent (10-3). More precisely, the "Fisher Effect" calculates the real
discount rate (r) as equal to the nominal discount rate (i) minus the expected inflation rate
(m) divided by one plus the expected inflation rate. [Ref 18: p 130]
Real Discount Rate (r) = (i - m) / ( 1 + m) Equation 4.
Although the Excel spreadsheet used in this thesis allows for the computation of
real discount rates (using the Fisher Effect), this thesis will focus on nominal discount
rates. The logic behind this is that some prior studies were completed during periods of
time that had high inflation rates while other studies were completed during periods of
low inflation. By using nominal discount rates (non-inflation adjusted), this thesis will be
able to better compare discount rates across various historical time periods.
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In essence, the personal discount rate (PDR) is a major factor in determining the
net present value (NPV) of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) for each individual
service member. This thesis does not suggest that each service member sits down and
performs the calculations necessary to derive their own PDR. However, by observing
service member's choices, the implied PDR can be identified.
When computing an individual's NPV of future payment streams (such as the
SRB), the PDR selected will have a profound effect on the outcome value. In most cases,
service members may have little idea as to what their PDR actually is and chances are
that no two randomly selected service members will have the same PDR. However,
several studies have been completed that show differences in implied PDRs based on
demographic characteristics. The findings of these studies will be examined in the next
section.
C. DIFFERENCES IN PERSONAL DISCOUNT RATES BY DEMOGRAPHIC
GROUP
The demographic group that is eligible for SRB's in Zone A in the Marine Corps
is best characterized as a 22-year-old white male with a high school education. It would
be nearly impossible to determine every Marine's personal discount rate (PDR) because
of all the observed and unobserved factors that go into its determination. However,
because the PDR used in the calculation of net present value (NPV) is so important, it is
meaningful to get a feeling about how PDRs vary among demographic groups. Several
studies have been completed that address this aspect of PDR.
Mackin shows that nominal discount rates of males and non-whites are higher
than whites and females, which would suggest that the lump-sum alternative is more
attractive to the former group than the latter. [Ref 15: p 6] Mackin also notes that there is
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potential for this to apply to any delayed pay policy such as retirement pay or G.I. Bill
educational benefits. Mackin cautions policy makers that one of the unintended effects of
delayed payments of benefits (such as the current SRB payment method) is that certain
demographic groups (such as non-whites) may be impacted disproportionately by the
policy. In other words, some programs may not appeal to non-whites as much as they do
to whites, thus inadvertently shaping the force in unintended ways.
Warner and Pleeter used the personal characteristics of age, race, sex, education
level, number of dependents, and mental ability as demographic factors in their study to
determine PDRs based on personnel decisions during the military draw-down period of
the early 1990s. Their findings suggest that the characteristics of being young and black
tend to increase an individual's PDR. They also found that, "Those with more education
generally have significantly lower probabilities of separation, however, having more
dependents does not affect the probability of separation." [Ref 16: p 16] Warner and
Pleeter also estimated that blacks have a 6.3 percent higher PDR than whites. Nord and
Schmitz also report that a retention program based on immediate bonuses is likely to be
most favorable to inexperienced (young) personnel, minorities, singles, and non-college
graduates. [Ref 17: p 22] This demographic group, for the most part, is the group that is
eligible for the USMC Zone A reenlistment bonus.
Overall, the studies indicate that there are differences in individual PDRs across
various demographic groups. The findings show the highest PDRs among young males,
with black young males being significantly higher than whites. The reader should be
aware that the consequences of the current SRB payment method may unintentionally
affect the demographic make up of our force structure. Another consequence of these
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differences in PDR by "demographic group" is that it makes it more difficult to pick a
"single" PDR to analyze the behavior of those eligible for a Zone A reenlistment bonus.
D. ANALYSES OF PERSONAL DISCOUNT RATES
"Present-Value analysis is a generally accepted practice, but selecting an
appropriate interest ratefor discounting is subject to much controversy." [Ref 6: p 8]
1. Methodology of Prior Studies
Selecting the proper interest rate to use for deriving a NPV is a well-studied topic
in the finance and economic literature. There are three main types of studies that have
analyzed the issue of personal discount rates: 1) Market rate studies; 2) Implicit rate
studies; and 3) Direct assessment studies.
Market rate studies use economic theory to predict what a "rational" decision-
maker would use for his or her discount rate. Market rate studies assume that individuals
have diminishing marginal rates of "utility" on additional consumption, that there is a
single "market" interest rate to use in all discounting, and that there is the potential for an
individual to borrow up to his/her NPV of lifetime future earnings potential. Nord and
Schmitz estimate the discount rate determined by market rate studies to range between
7.2 percent and 30 percent. [Ref 17: p 6]
The strength of market studies lie in their firm theoretical foundation. The
greatest weakness of market studies is the lack of empirical evidence to support the
theory they are based on. Another weakness is the determination of the proper "single"
market rate of interest to use. When some mutual funds are generating over 100 percent
annual rates of return in the bull stock market of the late 1990's it is easy to see that
predicting a single discount rate is very difficult to do. For example, many individuals
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have a related problem deciding whether to leave their savings invested in the stock
market or pay down a large portion of a new home purchase.
The second approach called implicit rate studies, rely on the observed actual
decisions individuals make to derive a PDR. The major strength of this approach is that
it uses real decisions made by individuals who will reap or pay the consequences of then-
actions. The weakness of the approach is that sometimes assumptions must be made in
regard to the information the decision-maker is using to make his/her decision. Another
weakness of implicit rate studies is that the rate should not be taken out of context. For
example, a PDR obtained by studying how people purchase an energy efficient
refrigerator (or a less costly non-efficient refrigerator) should not be assumed to hold true
for a person thinking about taking out a second mortgage on their home to pay for a trip
to Las Vegas. Implicit rate studies have derived PDRs ranging between 1.2 percent and
39 percent. [Ref 17: p 6] The research literature concludes that if an appropriate (similar
decisions with similar dollar amounts at stake) study exists, the PDR derived by such a
study is the most appropriate to use in calculating an individual's NPV.
Finally, the direct assessment method uses survey data to derive an individual's
PDR. The weakness of this approach lies in the fact that the decisions are merely
hypothetical and the surveyed individual will not suffer any consequences of his/her
choices. The respondent will also not put the time or thinking into a survey as he/she
would put into a "real" monetary decision. Another problem with the direct assessment
method is that the resultant PDR has the potential to be greatly affected by the wording of
the survey questions.
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The strengths of the direct assessment method are that the survey questions can be
tailored to a decision the researcher is interested in (ie. SRB payment options could be
used for this thesis), and the survey sample group can be selected from the appropriate
decision-maker. For example, a survey relevant to this thesis would use military
members who are approaching the completion of their first term of service. Also, with
considerable attention to detail, the phrasing of the survey questions can be worded so it
does not affect the survey outcome. Direct assessment studies have derived PDRs which
range between 8 percent and 23 percent. [Ref 17: p 8]
2. Predicted Rates
From the literature review, two implicit discount rate studies stand out as being
particularly applicable to the issue in this thesis. In these two studies: (a) the decision
makers (individuals studied) were military service members; (b) the decisions being
made were about dollar amounts similar to that of the SRB; and (c) in one case (Cylke
et. al) the Selective Reenlistment Bonus payment effects were studied in a "natural
experiment" when the SRB payment method changed to one of lump sum (April 1979
through January 1982). These two studies so closely resemble the research topic area
that the author believes they are the most pertinent to this thesis.
Warner and Pleeter Study . In 1991 Congress directed the Department of Defense
(DOD) to reduce the military's end-strength numbers by 400,000 personal. DOD was
directed not to make this change in any one segment of the military (ie. not just
retirement-eligible personnel). In order to implement this reduction, two programs were
authorized. The first was a Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI) program that provided
an annuity to the service member at a rate of 2.5 percent of their base pay times the
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number of years of service they had served. The length of the annuity was for twice the
number of years the service member had already served. The other program offered was
the Selective Separation Benefit (SSB), which was a lump sum payment determined by
multiplying the service member's YOS by 15 percent of his/her base pay. In NPV terms,
these two methods were far from equal. Using the available market "savings" interest
rate of 7 percent the VSI annuity had a far greater NPV than the lump sum SSB (the
magnitude of this NPV "difference" varied by YOS and pay grade).
Warner and Pleeter used a probit model and a log-linear probit model to estimate
separation decisions for over 11,000 officers and 55,000 enlisted personnel between the
ages of 25 and 35. Their findings estimated an average PDR for the sample of 19.8
percent. Warner and Pleeter' s enlisted personnel findings are shown in Table 1 below.
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Table 1 Warner and Pleeter's PDRs for Enlisted Personnel [Ref 16: p 29]
At first glance, the reported PDRs for enlisted personnel appear to be implausibly
high. However, Warner and Pleeter also found that the "probability of choosing the lump
sum declines sharply with the after-tax lump sum amount. This result implies that
individuals do in fact discount larger sums at a lower rate than smaller sums with the
estimated decline of PDR by over 5 percent for each $10,000 increase in the lump sum
amount." [Ref 16: p 18] The officer PDRs are reasonable in comparison to the majority
of prior PDR studies.
Warner and Pleeter's officer results are shown below in Table 2
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Table 2 Warner and Pleeter's PDRs for Officers [Ref 16: p 29]
Another relevant finding by Warner and Pleeter was that the PDR varied with the
time delay of the payment stream. "Individuals appear to discount future rates
hyperbolically, applying higher discount rates to amounts with a short delay." [Ref 16: p
6] This appears to be very applicable to the three-year time delay used in the current
SRB payment method. When the enlisted PDRs were adjusted for the difference in total
dollars impacted by the individual's decision and the demographic differences such as
age and education, over half of the difference between officer and enlisted PDRs was
accounted for. [Ref 16: p 20]
Cvlke et al. Study . Cylke et al. examined the changes in the reenlistment rates of
sailors between April 1979 and January 1982 when the SRB payment method was
temporally changed to lump sum. This afforded the opportunity to study a "natural
experiment" of the effectiveness of changing the SRB payment method. Cylke defined
the "reenlistment rate" as "the fraction of individuals who choose to reenlist (remain in
the service) among those whose initial enlistments expire within a given fiscal year."
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This group is identical to the group this thesis is analyzing with the exceptions that the
natural experiment applied only to the Navy and it was conducted over 20 years ago.
Cylke et al. found that the installment SRB payment method was only 71 percent
as effective as the lump sum SRB payment method in retaining enlisted personnel. [Ref
5: p 7] Using a logistic regression with variables accounting for the unemployment rate
and time, Cylke et al. determined that, "On the margin, Navy enlisted personnel have a
'nominal' discount rate of 29.1 percent." [Ref 5: p 11] Cylke reports most of his
findings in terms of "real" discount rates; however, it should be noted that during the time
of his study, he adjusted for inflation using a 10.4 percent "expected" inflation rate,
which is considered to be very high in today's (2000) low-inflation economy.
The appropriate single PDR to apply to Marines completing their first term of
service is still hard to identify. Rather, the author feels that a PDR range would be more
practical to use in this analysis. There is a new growing business that pays individuals a
lump sum amount in exchange for annuity payment streams the individuals have either
earned for their retirement or have been awarded in a law suit. Although this practice has
been scrutinized by the government and the exact "charge" for converting annuities to
lump sum is not known, the Wall Street Journal estimates these businesses earn around a
21 percent rate of return on their business ventures. [Ref 19, p A8] The military as a
group experiences a riskier lifestyle than the average civilian. Therefore, the author
believes military personnel have higher PDR's than their civilian counterparts. Also, as
most who are familiar with the military know, the stores outside military establishments
are not short of "pawn" or "check cashing" shops that charge very high rates of interest
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for their services. Therefore, this thesis will apply a PDR range for Zone A military
service members from 21 percent to 41 percent, with an expected PDR of 3 1 percent.
E. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE LUMP SUM PAYMENT
METHOD
As with any proposed policy change, there are several advantages and
disadvantages that emerge from the literature review and from discussions with USMC
manpower planners in Quantico, Virginia in regard to changing the SRB payment method
to lump sum. Below are some of the major advantages and disadvantages of switching to
a lump sum SRB payment method.
1. Advantages of the Lump Sum Payment Method
A 1985 General Accounting Office report [Ref 6: p 7-10] noted three major
advantages of the lump sum payment method. The report stated that lump sum SRB
payments are: 1) More cost-efficient than installment bonuses; 2) More readily visible
to Congressional and DOD decision makers; and 3) Less limiting to decision-makers
when fiscal reductions must be made.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) proposes that because young people tend
to have a strong preference towards current consumption (as discussed above in the PDR
section) they prefer current dollars over future dollars. A service member who has a real
PDR of 21 percent would be indifferent between receiving $10,000 using the current
SRB payment method or receiving $8,457 today. If the government's discount rate is
less than the individual's PDR, the government would be "better off paying the money
in a lump sum. In January 2000, the government's official 30-year, long-term (the author
considers SRBs to be long-term unless they are going to stop being paid in the near
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future) nominal discount rate was 6.3 percent. [Ref 20: p 7] Using a real government
rate of 9.5 percent and a real PDR of 17 percent, the 1985 GAO report estimated, "The
total cost of Navy SRBs awarded during FY 1986 could be reduced by about $13 million
if the lump sum method were used." [Ref 6: p 8] Presumably, the GAO analysts mean
the Navy could achieve the same retention rate but at a cost that is $13 million less.
Another advantage of paying SRBs in lump sum payments cited by GAO is that it
makes the "true" costs of the SRB budget more readily visible to Congressional and DOD
decision-makers. The installment method incorporates an "obligation" for the
government that is not reflected in the current fiscal year SRB budget. This creates
hidden future year outlay obligations. Hypothetically, if a Service manpower planner
requests a FY 2000 SRB budget of $300 million (of which $100 million would be used to
make current anniversary payments under the installment plan), the true "total cost" of
the SRB payments could be $500 million ($100 million for anniversary payments, $200
million for first year bonus payments, and $200 million of obligated payments to first-
time bonus recipients). Thus, a future obligation of $200 million would be
unintentionally hidden in the budget. Using the lump sum payment method, the "true"
cost of the SRB program would be easily identifiable.
The third advantage of lump sum payments the GAO report notes is that lump
sum SRB payments are indeed less restrictive than installment payments for
Congressional and DOD decision makers in fiscally constrained times. If, for example,
an across-the-board fiscal reduction was called for, DOD planners would be required to
reduce SRB levels totally among the "current year" SRB-eligible manpower pool. This is
because the other 50 percent of the SRB budget (installment method) are already
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obligated. Thus, manpower planners may suffer more retention problems in the current
year's eligible pool because they simply won't be able to offer the bonuses to incentivize
reenlistments. In the military's "no lateral entry" system, this one-year problem will
cascade into future time periods.
Based on the PDR research results for demographic groups, another advantage of
the lump sum payment would be the elimination of any "unintentional" effects
installment method payments may have on the force structure of the Marine Corps by
race, age, or gender. The magnitude of this effect is only speculative; however, the
research indicates the ratio of "non-white" to "white" reenlistments would increase if the
SRB payment method were to be changed to the lump sum method.
Finally, with the growing business of buying "future payment streams" booming
in the United States, changing the payment plan to lump sum may prevent Marines from
taking their SRB contract to these types of businesses and receiving a lump sum for them
at a very high discounted rate.
2. Disadvantages of the Lump Sum Payment Method
A disadvantage of the lump sum payment method noted by the 1985 GAO study
is that it may reduce the incentive for reenlistees to complete their initial contract. Cylke
et al. define this potential to default on one's contract as a "moral hazard." [Ref 5: p 16]
However, Cylke et al. examined the historical survival rate of Navy personnel during the
installment period prior to 1979 and found that it was nearly 98 percent. They concluded
that the "moral hazard" issue was not an important factor. [Ref 5: p 19]
Another disadvantage noted by the GAO and by Marine Corps manpower
planners is that paying SRBs in lump sum amounts makes the bonus less visible to the
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service member over the entire length of the contract period. Thus, a service member
may take the bonus but by the third or fourth year may not remember the benefits he/she
gleaned from the bonus.
A disadvantage for the government of changing the SRB payment method to lump
sum is that the current SRB budget would have to be increased to cover the new payment
method. This is because the government would have to continue paying the SRBs it is
obligated to make while paying 100 percent of the "lump sum method" SRB in the
transition year. The first year of change would incur the largest budget increase with
each additional year after the transition becoming less costly. Approximately four years
after the payment method change, all the past SRB obligations would be paid off and the
SRB budget would be the same as it is today (in constant dollars).
A final disadvantage of paying SRBs in lump sum is that the money may not be
spent wisely by the Marine. In other words, the Marine may "blow" the cash on a trip to
Las Vegas or as a down payment on a car that he/she cannot afford. It was reported in
the Wall Street Journal that many civilian retirees are selecting the option to receive their
retirement in a lump sum amount and then spending it unwisely. "They bought boats,
houses, trailers, trucks, guns, furniture, fishing gear and satellite dishes . . . Financial
advisors say they have seen people use retirement money to fix the roof, pay for
children's weddings and go to Las Vegas . . . Younger employees were the likeliest to
spend every dime." [Ref 21: p Al] Of course, a counter argument is that the USMC
should not be in the business of telling its members how to spend their paychecks. Note




This chapter has provided a historical perspective on net present value, the personal
discount rate, observed differences of PDR between demographic groups, the types of
studies used to determine PDRs, and the advantages and disadvantages of switching to a
lump sum SRB payment method. The PDR among demographic groups was found to be
significantly higher (approximately 5 percent) for non-whites than whites making the
current SRB payment method less appealing to non-whites than whites. Implicit rate
studies were determined to be the most accurate predictors of a "group's" PDR if the
context of the natural experiment closely resembles the group of interest. Two implicit
PDR studies matched this requirement. Cylke et al. studied a natural experiment when
the SRB payment method was changed temporally to lump sum. Warner and Pleeter
studied the decisions of military personnel on whether to take a lump sum or annuity-
based early separation package during the draw-down era in the early 1990's. Based on
this literature review, the author adopted a reasonable nominal PDR range for Zone A
Marines of between 21 percent and 41 percent with an "expected" nominal PDR of 31
percent.
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IV. ESTIMATES OF EFFECT OF LUMP SUM SRB ON REENLISTMENT
RATES
A. METHODOLOGY
1. Review of PDR Estimates
In the previous chapter, it was determined from the literature review that an
accurate "range" of expected personal discount rates (PDRs) for the Marine Corps' Zone
A eligible Marines is between 21 percent and 41 percent with a mean rate of 31 percent.
These alternative PDRs will be used in this chapter to analyze the effects of changing the
SRB payment method to lump sum.
2. Review ofUSMC SRB Planning / Budgeting Process
The Marine Corps basis its SRB budget and retention estimates on historical
reenlistment data held by Marine Corps planners and a 1994 Center for Naval Analysis
study by Dr. James H. North. [Ref 8] Dr. North studied the cost effectiveness of the
SRB and lateral moves from one Marine Occupational Specialty (MOS) to another MOS.
In order to accomplish this, he had to analyze the effects of the SRB on retention
behavior.
Dr. North estimated the probability of reenlistment as a function of the SRB
multiple, the contract length, the Marine's occupational field, a pay index, and the
civilian unemployment rate. [Ref 22: p 26] The pay index and economic factors
(unemployment rate) used in Dr. North's model are updated every two years by the
Center for Naval Analysis and applied by Marine Corps SRB planners in setting the SRB
multiples to offer Marines.
Military pay raises are historically given on an annual basis and become effective
on the first day of January. Although the entire pay raise for a given year occurs on one
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day, it has been assumed by Dr. North that the effects of a pay raise do not all occur on
this single day. This is because information regarding the pay raise normally makes it out
to the military members far in advance of the effective pay raise date. Dr. North's pay
index uses average changes in the military's pay table and normalizes the "annual" pay
increase experienced by military personnel (on 1 January) to reflect monthly pay raises,
which are then compared to pay raises in the civilian labor market. For civilian earnings,
he uses quarterly data provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics to reflect the
opportunities available to 20- to 24-year old males. The time span of the data used in his
1994 study was from 1987 through 1992. After adjusting the data for non-applicable
items (such as out-year reenlisting that is not an offered option today), Dr. North's data
set consisted of 40,984 observations over the 1987 - 1992 time period. [Ref 22: p 21]
The functional form of Dr. North's model was a nonlinear logit specification. The
specification which fit the data the best was "one that included separate Occupational
Field variables without an interaction with the SRB multiple." [Ref 22: p 27]
Dr. North's pay index is updated every other year by the Center for Naval
Analysis and provided to Marine Corps manpower planners. The author compared the
FY 2000 update with those of FY 1996 and FY 1998. The 1996 and 1998 updates had
almost identical predicted reenlistment rates. The FY 1998 estimates predicted that
retention would increase by an average of 0.9 percent as compared to FY 1996. The FY
2000 update predicted that retention levels would drop an average 5.1 percent. For
comparison purposes, the FY 2000 retention estimates were subtracted from the FY 1998
estimates and the FY 1998 estimates were subtracted from the FY 1996 estimates. [Refs
23, 24, 25] Table 3 below compiles the results of this calculation.
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Average Median Mode Max Min Std Dev
FY 98 - FY 00 5.1% 5.4% 6.7% 6.7% 2.0% 0.01374
FY 96 - FY 98 -0.9% -0.9% -0.7% 0.7% -3.9% 0.00618
Table 3 - Differences in Marine Corps-Wide Predicted Retention Using C.N.A. Retention Forecasts
The Marine Corps uses these updates as a basis for setting up its First-Term
Alignment Plan (FTAP). The FTAP determines how many Marines the Marine Corps
will need to bring into the "career force." Career force is defined here as those Marines
who have greater than four years of service. The FTAP sets the bonus multiples in each
MOS to help incentivize Marines to reenlist in areas that are expected to experience
manning shortfalls. The annual update of Occupational Field retention estimates is also
used as justification for the Marine Corps SRB budget request to Congress. The fiscal
year 2000 Center for Naval Analysis predicted reenlistment rates for each Marine




1 2 3 4 5
01 35.1% 44.0% 53.3% 62.4% 70.7% 77.8%
02 8.5% 12.0% 16.5% 22.3% 29.4% 37.7%
03 8.3% 11.6% 16.0% 21.7% 28.7% 37.0%
04 14.2% 19.4% 26.0% 33.8% 42.6% 51.9%
08 10.6% 14.7% 20.0% 26.6% 34.6% 43.4%
11 9.9% 13.8% 18.9% 25.3% 33.0% 41.7%
13 11.2% 15.6% 21.1% 28.0% 36.1% 45.1%
15 36.4% 45.4% 54.8% 63.8% 71.9% 78.8%
18 9.5% 13.2% 18.1% 24.4% 31.9% 40.5%
21 11.9% 16.4% 22.2% 29.3% 37.6% 46.7%
23 8.3% 11.6% 16.1% 21.8% 28.8% 37.0%
25 19.1% 25.6% 33.3% 42.1% 51.4% 60.6%
26 7.9% 11.1% 15.3% 20.9% 27.7% 35.8%
28 8.5% 1 1 .9% 16.4% 22.2% 29.3% 37.5%
30 24.7% 32.3% 40.9% 50.2% 59.4% 68.0%
31 34.4% 43.2% 52.5% 61.7% 70.0% 77.3%
33 17.0% 23.0% 30.3% 38.7% 47.8% 57.1%
34 19.7% 26.3% 34.2% 43.0% 52.3% 61.5%
35 10.9% 15.1% 20.6% 27.3% 35.3% 44.3%
40 12.7% 17.5% 23.5% 30.9% 39.4% 48.6%
41 63.6% 71 .8% 78.7% 84.3% 88.6% 91.9%
43 7.0% 9.9% 13.7% 18.8% 25.1% 32.8%
44 18.6% 25.0% 32.6% 41.3% 50.6% 59.8%
46 18.0% 24.2% 31.7% 40.3% 49.5% 58.7%
55 25.9% 33.7% 42.5% 51.8% 60.9% 69.4%
57 13.4% 18.3% 24.6% 32.1% 40.8% 50.0%
58 9.8% 13.6% 18.6% 25.0% 32.6% 41.3%
59 9.0% 12.5% 17.2% 23.2% 30.6% 39.0%
60 10.6% 14.7% 20.1% 26.8% 34.7% 43.6%
61 11.2% 15.4% 21.0% 27.9% 35.9% 44.9%
63 8.9% 12.4% 17.1% 23.1% 30.4% 38.8%
64 9.5% 13.3% 18.2% 24.4% 31.9% 40.5%
65 12.2% 16.9% 22.8% 30.0% 38.4% 47.5%
66 24.7% 32.3% 40.9% 50.2% 59.4% 68.0%
68 11.9% 16.5% 22.3% 29.4% 37.7% 46.8%
70 18.1% 24.3% 31.8% 40.4% 49.6% 58.8%
72 10.6% 14.7% 20.0% 26.6% 34.6% 43.4%
73 7.2% 10.1% 14.1% 19.2% 25.7% 33.5%
9919 12.7% 17.5% 23.5% 30.9% 39.4% 48.6%
Table 4. Center for Naval Analysis FY 2000 Predicted Reenlistment Rates by SRB Multiple and
Occupational Field [Ref 23: p 3]
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The validity of CNA's predicted reenlistment rates has been hard to establish
because of the inherent flexibility required by Marine planners during the fiscal year.
Bonus multiples often change quarterly. The current manpower policy is to offer the
highest bonus multiple during the first quarter of the fiscal year and reduce the SRB
multiple as Occupational Fields start to fill up. This policy is followed to reduce the
potential for Marines to "game" the system by holding out for a better multiple. Because
multiples are in a constant state of change, tracking the outcome of any given
Occupational Field is difficult at best. Appendix A lists the title of each Occupational
Field used in this thesis.
3. Methodology for Analyzing SRB Payment Methods
This thesis is interested in the effects of changing the Selective Reenlistment
Bonus (SRB) payment method to lump sum. To do this, I obtained the current number of
Marines eligible/available for reenlistment (by Occupational Field (OF)) in FY 2000
from the Marine Corps Enlisted Career Planner. The Excel model uses the Center for
Naval Analysis (CNA) retention estimates (in Table 4 above) to determine the
"additional" number of Marines each bonus multiple will retain using the current SRB
payment method and the current "eligible" pool of Marines in each OF. This is the
"marginal effect" of each increase in the bonus multiple. The model assumes the
reenlistee is a Corporal (E-4) with over four years of service and a contract reenlistment
length of four years. Using the January 2000 pay tables the base monthly pay of this
reenlistee is $1,497.30. [Ref 26] Selective Reenlistment Bonus is paid by multiplying
base pay times length of contract times a SRB multiple of one through five. [Ref 27: p 3]
Table 5 shows the value of the SRB contract for values of the SRB multiple using the
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hypothetical Marine. The Excel model has been programmed to incorporate future
changes in the estimated retention (rates for each SRB multiple) and pay in a single "user
input" worksheet.







Table 5 - SRB Contract Values by Multiple for Hypothetical Marine
The model then determines the net present value (NPV) of each SRB multiple
using a personal discount rate (PDR) entered by the analyst. In this analysis, PDRs of 21
percent, 31 percent, and 41 percent will be used and compared under the current SRB
payment method. The model then determines the marginal effect on retention for every
$1,000 of NPV for each SRB multiple. It then takes the "delta" between the NPVs of the
current SRB payment method and the proposed lump sum SRB payment method and
multiplies this "delta" by the marginal effect (ME) per $1,000 of NPV calculated above.
This produces an estimation of the change in the number of Marines who would reenlist
should the payment method be changed. Mathematically, the model makes the following
calculations:
$NPV $1,000
Marginal Effect Retention Increase per SRB Multiple X
Where "X" equals the marginal increase in retention (measured in "bodies" for
every $ 1 ,000 of NPV paid
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$ 1 ,000 * (Marginal Effect Retention Increase per SRB Multiple)
$NPV
.
_ ___ Delta in Payment Method NPV*X
Increase in Retention per LumSum SRB =
$1,000
4. Possible Model Outputs
This model has an unlimited number of outputs it could produce. It can display
the marginal retention effects of changing SRB payments to lump sum for each 1-unit
change in the SRB multiple for each occupational field. This data, however, would take
the reader a very long time to sort through and would not really apply to the Marine
Corps' actual manpower planning process. Therefore, I have chosen for this application
to use the actual FY 2000 SRB multiples that have been adopted and estimated the
change in retention levels that would occur in 2000 if the SRB payment method were
switched to lump sum. This means that if the Marine Corps is paying a "zero" multiple,
no change will be noted in retention levels. The analysis is done by OF and the net gains
will be applicable to today's (FY 2000) SRB program. The next section discusses the
results of the "range" of PDRs used in this analysis.
B. RESULTS
1. Change in Predicted Retention From Using Lump Sum Method
The Excel model was run using estimated personal discount rates of 21, 31, and
41 percent. The three runs are shown below in tables 6, 7, and 8, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forecast Forecast Net Gain
Retention- Retention- from
Proposed Contract Current Lump sum Lump Sum
SRB Amount * Payment Payment Method
OccFId Multiple a ($) Method Method = (5)
-(4)
01 465 465
02 4 23,957 147 166 19
03 1 5,989 614 646 32
04 2 11,978 123 133 10
08 4 23,957 215 242 27
11 1 5,989 64 67 3
13 142 142
15 36 36
18 1 5,989 54 57 3
21 2 11,978 130 141 11
23 1 5,989 27 29 1
25 1 5,989 384 402 18
26 4 23,957 65 73 8




34 3 17,968 78 86 8
35 250 250
40 5 29,946 121 137 16
41 1 1




57 2 11,978 28 30 2
58 1 5,989 89 93 5
59 4 23,957 37 41 5
60 5 29,946 371 423 51
61 4 23,957 176 198 22
63 4 23,957 125 141 16
64 4 23,957 137 154 17
65 2 11,978 75 81 6
66 65 65
68 4 23,957 18 20 2
70 1 5,989 90 94 4
72 4 23,957 84 95 11
73 5 29,946 6 7 1
9919 5 29,946 10 11 1
Total 4926 5260 335
Table 6. Effects of Lump Sum SRB on Retention using a 21 Percent Personal Discount Rate
a This column provides the SRB multiple proposed by MPP-20 for each Occupation Field in FY 2000.
[Ref8]
b Value of SRB Multiple for the 'average' reenlistee.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forecast Forecast Net Gain
Retention- Retention- from
Proposed Contract Current Lump sum Lump Sum
SRB Amount * Payment Payment Method
OccFId Multiple a ($) Method Method = (6) -(5)
01 465 465
02 4 23,957 147 173 26
03 1 5,989 614 658 44
04 2 11,978 123 137 14
08 4 23,957 215 253 38
11 1 5,989 64 69 5
13 142 142
15 36 36
18 1 5,989 54 58 4
21 2 11,978 130 145 15
23 1 5,989 27 29 2
25 1 5,989 384 408 25
26 4 23,957 65 77 12




34 3 17,968 78 89 11
35 250 250
40 5 29,946 121 143 22
41 1 1




57 2 11,978 28 31 3
58 1 5,989 89 95 6
59 4 23,957 37 43 7
60 5 29,946 371 442 71
61 4 23,957 176 207 31
63 4 23,957 125 147 22
64 4 23,957 137 161 24
65 2 11,978 75 84 9
66 65 65
68 4 23,957 18 21 3
70 1 5,989 90 96 6
72 4 23,957 84 99 15
73 5 29,946 6 8 1
9919 5 29,946 10 12 2
Total 4926 5388 463
Table 7. Effects of Lump Sum SRB on Retention using a 31 Percent Personal Discount Rate
a This column provides the SRB multiple proposed by MPP-20 for each Occupation Field in FY 2000.
[Ref 8]
b Value of SRB Multiple for the 'average' reenlistee.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forecast Forecast Net Gain
Retention- Retention- from
Proposed Contract Current Lump sum Lump Sum
SRB Amount b Payment Payment Method
OccFId Multiple a ($) Method Method = (5)
-(4)
01 465 465
02 4 23,957 147 179 33
03 1 5,989 614 669 55
04 2 11,978 123 141 18
08 4 23,957 215 262 47
11 1 5,989 64 70 6
13 142 142
15 36 36
18 1 5,989 54 59 5
21 2 11,978 130 149 19
23 1 5,989 27 30 2
25 1 5,989 384 414 31
26 4 23,957 65 79 15




34 3 17,968 78 92 13
35 250 250
40 5 29,946 121 148 28
41 1 1




57 2 11,978 28 32 4
58 1 5,989 89 97 8
59 4 23,957 37 45 8
60 5 29,946 371 460 88
61 4 23,957 176 214 38
63 4 23,957 125 152 28
64 4 23,957 137 167 30
65 2 11,978 75 86 11
66 65 65
68 4 23,957 18 22 4
70 1 5,989 90 97 7
72 4 23,957 84 102 18
73 5 29,946 6 8 2
9919 5 29,946 10 12 2
Total 4926 5500 574
Table 8. Effects of Lump Sum SRB on Retention using a 41 Percent Personal Discount Rate8
a. This column provides the SRB multiple proposed by MPP-20 for each Occupation Field in FY 2000.
[Ref 8]
b Value of SRB Multiple for the 'average' reenlistee.
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The analysis indicates that the Marine Corps has the potential to increase Zone A
reenlistments by between 6.8, 9.4, or 11.7 percent (overall) by changing the SRB
payment method to lump sum (depending on PDR). This change would require no
increase in the SRB budget in the long term (after four years). This equates to 335
additional Marines using a 21 percent PDR, 463 additional Marines using a 31 percent
PDR, and 574 additional Marines using a 41 percent PDR. The increase would not "fix"
the shortfalls occurring in FY 2000, however; they would greatly reduce the retention
problem for the Corps. The four Marine Occupational Fields that are estimated to benefit
the most from changing the SRB payment method (for PDRs of 21, 31, and 41 percent)
are; Fixed Wing Aircraft Maintenance (51,71,88), Infantry (32,44,55), Data
Communications Maintenance (31,43,54), and Field Artillery (27,38,47). These fields
are either combat arms or require a lot of technical training and have high civilian
employment opportunities.
2. Change in Predicted Retention Holding Reenlistment Requirement
Constant
Another way to view the benefit from changing the SRB payment method to lump
sum is that the SRB bonus payments can be reduced while still obtaining the required
number of reenlisting Marines. The outcome of this would be to lower the cost
associated with reducing the SRB budget. There are many problems associated with
doing this using an Excel spreadsheet, such as some Occupation Fields (OF) may be
over-staffed while others are under-staffed even though the "total" reenlistment number
may look fine. The author attempted to use the built-in Excel "solver" program but the
calculation exceeded the "solver" program's capabilities. It is possible that this problem
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could be solved by inputting the data in a more powerful, non-PC based program, but
time does not allow for this action in this thesis.
One suggestion, offered by a Professor of the Naval Postgraduate School
Operations Research Department was to simply reduce each offered FY 2000 SRB
multiple by one and to see what happened. One drawback of this method is that many of
the SRB multiples offered by the Marine Corps in FY 2000 are set at one. By reducing
the multiple from one to zero, there will be no effect of changing the payment method
because no payment would be made at all. With this in mind, I reduced all FY 2000 SRB
multiples by one and ran the model using 21 percent, 31 percent, and 41 percent personal
discount rates. I then compared the retention estimates predicted by these "reduced"
multiples to the current payment method "requirement" number of 4,926 reenlistments
into the career force. The results are shown below in Table 9.
Required PDR FY 2000, SRB Multiple - 1 reenlistments Shortfall
Reenlistments
4,926 21% 4,247 679
4,926 31% 4,315 611
4,926 41% 4,374 552
Table 9 - Effects of Changing the SRB Payment Method to Lump Sum and Reducing the FY 2000
SRB Multiples by One.
As the reader can see, an across-the-board SRB multiple reduction using the
highest PDR still leaves Marine Corps manning levels below requirements. It could be
assumed, however, that some Occupation Fields could have their SRB multiples reduced
while still achieving the desired outcome. This simulation is recommended for a follow-
on effort.
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3. Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) Model Comparison
Dr. Pat Mackin from SAG Corporation in Falls Church, Virginia, provided the
ACOL model used in this thesis. It is a Microsoft Excel-based model that incorporates
all the aspects of ACOL discussed in chapter two of this thesis. It allows the operator to
adjust inflation rates (allowing for real or nominal PDRs to be used), personal discount
rates, length of service at the decision point, and payment method type (lump sum or
current method). The SAG Corporation's ACOL model also allows the user to change
demographic characteristics such as gender, race, age, dependent status, and education.
Although the model has been updated as recently as this year, the model depends on data
produced in 1988. Therefore, the ACOL spreadsheet produces figures (values) that are
deflated to reflect 1988 "constant" dollars.
The ACOL model maintained by SAG Corporation was also designed to be used
for personal discount rates of around 10 percent. The original ACOL analysis determined
real discount rates of around 10 percent at the time of the ACOL model's programming.
Dr. Mackin cautioned the author that the coefficients used in ACOL are not really
appropriate for a discount rate much higher than 10 percent. However, the author
believes the importance of running the ACOL model for this thesis is not the
determination of an "accurate" ACOL value to use in policy analysis, but to determine
how ACOL values are affected by changing the SRB payment method to lump sum.
I have chosen to run the ACOL model on a white, 23-year old male with a high
school education at the first term reenlistment point (four years of service). There will be
a total of 36 ACOL model runs; SRB bonus multiples of zero through five will be run
using PDRs of 21 percent, 31 percent, and 41 percent and both the current and proposed
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lump sum payment methods will be compared. Table 10 below presents the value of the
ACOL for these various options.




current $ 9,527 $10,718 $12,227 $13,769 $15,312 $16,855
method
21 percent
lumpsum $ 9,527 $11,144 $13,146 $15,149 $17,152 $19,155
31 percent
current $ 7,968 $ 9,667 $11,457 $13,254 $15,051 $16,849
method
31 percent
lumpsum $ 7,968 $10,374 $12,885 $15,397 $17,908 $20,420
41 percent
current $ 6,730 $ 8,729 $10,797 $12,865 $14,933 $17,001
method
41 percent
lumpsum $ 6,730 $ 9,714 $12,767 $15,820 $18,873 $21,926
Table 10 - ACOL Values for: Current vs. Lump Sum SRB Payment Methods
The ACOL runs show that lump sum SRB payments consistently produce a
higher ACOL for young naval service-members than the current SRB payment plan. Of
note about these results is that some ACOL values actually increase with a higher
personal discount rate (see lump sum multiples of 3 - 5 and current method multiple 5).
This can be attributed to using the last step of the ACOL model calculation that divides
the calculated ACOL value up to that point by the "annualizing" factor. The larger the
discount rate, the smaller this value is for a given horizon, making it difficult to compare
ACOL values across discount rates. [Ref 28]
The ACOL model can be manipulated by manually inputting a value of $1,000
into the "baseline" ACOL for a sailor who has four years of service into the "ACOL
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Values and Econometric Coefficients" worksheet of the model. The next manipulation is
to enter a value of $2,000 into the "new" ACOL column for four years of service.
Switching to the "continuation rate" worksheet, the ACOL model predicts a 2.63 percent
increase in all-Navy SRB-targeted continuation rates per every $1,000 of ACOL value
increase. By dividing 2.63 percent by $1,000, an all-Navy continuation rate increase of
.0000263 for every one dollar increase in ACOL is calculated.
By changing the SRB payment from its current method to a lump sum produces
an increase in net present value and thus increases the value of the cost-of-leaving. This
increase is $2,300 using a 21 percent PDR, $3,571 for a 31 percent PDR, and $4,925 for a
41 percent PDR. These increases in the cost-of-leaving generate predicted increases in
all-Navy retention of 6.0 percent, 9.4 percent, and 12.9 percent, respectively, for discount
rates of 21, 31, and 41 percent.
Increase in Reenlistment rate (in %)







Table 11 - USMC Data / ACOL Model Comparison
As Table 11 shows, the predicted increases in reenlistment rates using the all-
Navy ACOL are very close in magnitude to the all-USMC increases obtained using the
Marine Corps data. This similarity between the results using the two approaches might
appear surprising. However, it should be pointed out that the CNA model that produces
the predicted retention rates (for each bonus multiple) is actually a variant of an ACOL-
type model. [Ref 22] For example, CNA's model includes a variable on the military-
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civilian pay differential, which is a key factor in the ACOL model. Thus, the similarity
in the results is not unexpected.
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter discussed the methodology used in estimating the net manpower
effects for the Marine Corps of changing the SRB payment method to lump sum. Using
the FY 2000 SRB multiples the results show an increase in retention of between 335 and
574 Marines. This resulted in a net increase in retention of between 6.8 and 11.7 percent.
It was determined that studying the possibility of keeping retention levels constant but
reducing the SRB was too complex of an option to study for this thesis. Finally, the
Navy's ACOL model estimated an increase in the ACOL value for PDRs of 21 percent,
31 percent, and 41 percent as an effect of changing the SRB payment method to lump
sum. The estimated effects on retention of the ACOL value increases are estimated to be
between 6.0 and 12.9 percent across all targeted Navy Occupation Fields.
The results of the well-established ACOL model reinforce the estimates produced
by the spreadsheet analysis using the CNA retention estimates for FY 2000. The
similarities in predicted increases in retention are most likely due to the fact that both the
ACOL model and the CNA estimates use similar data (unemployment rates, civilian
wage earnings) in their calculation.
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V. MONTE CARLO SIMULATION OF PERSONAL DISCOUNT RATES AND
USMC RETENTION ELASTICITIES (BY USMC OCCUPATIONAL
FIELD)
A. MONTE CARLO SIMULATION
The analysis in chapter IV provided the reader with a best guess of what might
happen should the SRB payment method be changed to lump sum. However, it only
provided a "what if analysis for three different personal discount rates and it adopted the
continuation rates forecast by the Center for Naval Analysis. Indeed, these assumptions
cannot be taken as totally accurate; there is a degree of uncertainty surrounding both the
correct PDR and the retention forecast.
A notorious example of a similar prediction is that of a "drunk in the road." If we
looked at a drunk's walk down the centerline of Interstate 95 while measuring and
recording his every footstep, we could accurately say that on average the drunk walked
on the centerline. If we used this analysis as a basis to "turn the drunk loose" on a walk
down Interstate 95, however, realistically we would not expect to see him alive again. He
would spend a lot of time to the left of centerline and perhaps a small amount of time far
to the right of centerline.
Monte Carlo simulation was developed in the 1940s as a by-product of the
Manhattan (Atomic Bomb) project. It involves feeding a large number of random inputs
into a model and recording the outcomes of the random inputs. [Ref 29: p 18] Monte
Carlo simulation is being used frequently today in areas of finance, accounting, logistics,
marketing, risk management and strategy. Whenever there is room for uncertainty,
Monte Carlo simulations allow for a better "understanding" of the overall picture.
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B. EXCEL BASED MONTE CARLO SIMULATON MODEL
1. How the Model Works
In the analysis of the proposed policy change to pay the Selective Reenlistment
Bonus in a lump sum amount, there are two major "uncertain" model inputs: 1) The
personal discount rate (PDR), and 2) The retention rate for each bonus multiple. In each
Occupational Field, the number of additional Marines who will reenlist is computed by
discounting the face value contract dollar amount back to today's dollars and determining
how many Marines will reenlist for every $1,000 of NPV. It then multiples the
difference between the face amount of the contract and the NPV of the contract times the
computed reenlistment rate per $1,000 of NPV to estimate the number of additional
Marines that will reenlist with a lump sum payment method. By allowing the PDR and
the CNA retention estimates to become uncertain, we have an ideal situation to use the
Monte Carlo simulation technique.
2. Model Methodology
The Monte Carlo analysis of the effects of changing the SRB payment method to
lump sum in this thesis relies on the Excel add-on computer program "INSIGHT.XLA".
It was created by Dr. Sam Savage of Stanford University. Using the "input interface"
worksheet of the author's model, a future manpower planner can select a most likely
PDR and SRB multiple retention forecast and vary the standard deviation around these
estimates. The Insight Excel add-on command "gen_normal" creates a normal random
distribution around these "best guess" estimates. If the operator of the model were
certain of his input, he would select a standard deviation setting of "0" and the model
would always generate the exact input value for the number being considered. This is
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how the chapter four results were obtained. If the operator was fairly certain of his/her
estimates for PDR and retention rates, they would input a standard deviation of "0.1". If
the operator was very uncertain of his/her estimates for PDR and retention rates, they
would put in a high standard deviation rate such as "2" or "3".
One problem specific to this model is that an individual cannot have a negative
personal discount rate nor can there be negative retention rates. This would be equivalent
to choosing the option to be paid less money in one year than today or having more
Marines decide upon the civilian job option than you have in the Corps (negative
reenlistment). The model therefore, does not allow for random generation of negative
PDRs or retention rates. Thus, if PDR is varied about a mean of say 21 percent, the
average PDR will increase above 21 percent as the variation increases. This is because
the variation stops on the low side at zero, but has unlimited upside potential. Below is
an example of increasing the standard deviation of the PDR (.1 - .5) about a mean PDR of
21 percent.
PDR
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Standard Deviation around 21% PDR
0.5
Figure 1-95 Percent Confidence Interval of Randomly Generated Personal Discount Rate (PDR)
Around a Mean PDR of 21 Percent using Increasing Standard Deviation Amounts
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Using a "0.4" standard deviation figure, one can see the upside PDR rate extends
to almost 90 percent while the low side is "cemented" at percent. This situation is not
unique to this model, however, for investors use Monte Carlo simulation in analyzing
stocks and options which all have more upside potential (unlimited) as compared to
downside potential (can only decrease in value to zero). For this model, however, the
constraining effects of not allowing for a negative PDR or a negative retention rate
combined, have a large impact on the model's outcome.
The author ran a Monte Carlo simulation using 0. 1 standard deviations around a
PDR mean of 21 percent and around CNA's retention estimates and compared the current
SRB payment method's retention to the lump sum payment method. Table 6 shows the
retention estimates without introducing uncertainty. The current SRB payment method in
this "constrained" case is only affected by the "uncertainty" surrounding the CNA
retention estimate (because the current payment method does not rely on a NPV).
However, the "average" expected retention levels for the current SRB payment method
increased by 742 Marines because of the "non-negative" retention constraint imposed on
CNA's estimates. Both the non-negative PDR constraint and the non-negative retention
constraint affect the lump sum estimate. The lump sum "average" retention increased by
846 Marines using a 2 1 percent PDR. This "average increase would be greater if a larger
PDR (31 percent) were used. A summary of the Monte Carlo simulation is in Table 12
below.
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Table 12 - Monte Carlo Results of Retention Estimates using 21 Percent PDR and Standard
Deviation of 0.1 around PDR and CNA Retention Estimates
To introduce uncertainty into this thesis while still allowing the results to be
meaningful, it was decided to reduce the standard deviations input into the model such
that they would not be affected by the "non-negative" real world constraints. Several
Monte Carlo simulations were run around a 21 percent personal discount rate to gain an
understanding of the distributions being randomly generated in the model. Figure 2
below shows a simulation run around 21 percent using standard deviations of 0.01, 0.03,




Figure 2 - Insight.xla Standard Deviation Distribution Around 21 Percent
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The smallest personal discount rate used in this thesis was 21 percent which
enables the input of a 0.1 standard deviation without going below zero (and thus forcing
the "average" simulation PDR up). The CNA FY 2000 forecast retention increases were
much smaller than 21 percent. There were a total of 195 CNA estimated marginal effect
values for bonus multiples one through five and 39 Occupational Fields. They are plotted
below in Figure 3 below.




















<fr <§> ^& JP J> <$ <§> <& *>Q>- O- O- O- O- O- O- O- Q>- ^
Marginal Effect Retention Percentage (%)
Increase
Figure 3 - Frequency Distribution of FY 2000 CNA Estimated Marginal Effects of Increasing SRB
Multiple for 39 Marine Occupational Fields
Referring to Figure 2, a 0.03 standard deviation will result in an outcome of plus
or minus 5 percent from the input value. Therefore, a maximum standard deviation for
the retention effects for the Monte Carlo simulations was 0.03. By limiting the input
standard deviation to 0.1 for PDR and 0.03 for C.N.A.'s FY 2000 retention estimates, the
author feels he is losing some of the benefits gained by performing a Monte Carlo
simulation. However, I feel this is a compromise between gaining "meaningful" results
and the introduction of greater "uncertainty" into the analysis.
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The model used in the analysis portion of this thesis is not "user friendly" enough
at this point to be used by a Marine planner who is not very familiar with Excel
spreadsheets and the Insight.xla add-on. However, the model has been programmed such
that it can easily incorporate future policy changes, pay raises, retention estimate
changes, and different estimates for PDR. It can be obtained by e-mailing the author at
rossdl@hotmail.com
C. RESULTS
As with the PDR range estimate portion of this thesis (chapter four), the number
of scenarios possible using Monte Carlo simulation are unlimited. I chose to run three
simulations using PDRs of 21 percent, 31 percent, and 41 percent and standard deviation
inputs of 0.1 around the PDR and 0.03 around CNA's FY 2000 SRB multiple retention
estimates. Each "run" consisted of 1,000 randomly generated "scenarios" where the PDR
and the retention rates were allowed to change. The graphs and tables for the three
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Monte Carlo - 1,000 Iterations
21 Percent PDR
Std Dev: 0.1 PDR. 0.03 C.N.A.
~^^^—Current Method
Mean of Current Method
Lum p Sum Method
— — Mean of Lump Sum Method
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
Total Number of Marines Reenlisting, All Occupation Fields
Figure 5 - Common Cumulative, Lump Sum vs. Current Method SRB Payment Method, 21 Percent
PDR
Output Name Current Method Lump Sum Method
Average 4933 5261
Std Dev 276 299
Std Err 8.74 9.47
Max 5830 6228
Min 4046 4338
Table 13 - Reenlistments, Lump Sum vs. Current Method SRB Payment Method, 21 Percent PDR
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Monte Carlo - 1 ,000 Iterations
31 Percent PDR
Std Dev: 0.1 PDR, 0.03 C.N.A.
Current Method
Mean of Current Method
"•"
"Lump Sum Method
Mean of Lump Sum Method
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
Total Number of Marines Reenlisting, All Occupation Fields
Figure 7 - Common Cumulative, Lump Sum vs. Current Method SRB Payment Method, 31 Percent
PDR
Output Name Current Method Lump Sum Method
Average 4947 5409
Std Dev 266 302
Std En- 8.42 9.58
Max 5847 6449
Min 4065 4460
Table 14 - Reenlistments, Lump Sum vs. Current Method SRB Payment Method, 31 Percent PDR
with 0.1 PDR Standard Deviation and 0.03 C.N.A. FY 2000 Retention Estimate Standard Deviation
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Monte Carlo - 1,000 Iterations
41 Percent PDR
Std Dev: 0.1 PDR, 0.03 C.N.A.
4269 4491 4713 4936 5158 5381 5603 5826 6048 6271 6493
Total Number of Marines Reenlisting, All Occupation Fields
Figure 8 - Common Histogram, Lump Sum vs. Current SRB Payment Method, 41 Percent PDR
Monte Carlo • 1,000 Iterations
41 Percent PDR
Std Dqv. 0.1 PDR. 0.03 C.NA
Current Method
* — — Mean of Current Method
Lump Sum Method
Mean of Lump Sum Method
Total Number of Marines Reenlisting, All
Figure 9 - Common Cumulative, Lump Sum vs. Current SRB Payment Method, 41 Percent PDR
Output Name Current Method Lump Sum Method
Average 4940 5513
Std Dev 270 310
Std Err 8.54 9.81
Max 5773 6493
Min 4046 4516
Table 15 - Reenlistments, Lump Sum vs. Current Method SRB Payment Method, 41 Percent PDR
with 0.1 PDR Standard Deviation and 0.03 C.N.A. FY 2000 Retention Estimate Standard Deviation
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Each page above shows the common histogram, common cumulative, and the
statistics that were generated from for the three PDRs of 21 percent, 31 percent, and 41
percent. The outcomes compare the total number of Marines (in all Occupational Fields)
who are predicted to reenlist using the current SRB payment method to those Marines
who are predicted to reenlist using the lump sum SRB payment method. The common
histogram and common cumulative are just different ways of showing the same data on
each separate page.
On the left side (Y axis) of the common histogram and common cumulative charts
are the probability of obtaining an outcome of a particular number of Marines reenlisting.
The bottom of each chart (X axis) shows the total number of Marines predicted to reenlist
for each given probability. Two conclusions can be drawn from these comparisons: 1)
The probability of obtaining a "given" number of Marine reenlistments increases when
using the lump sum SRB payment method; and 2) The higher the personal discount rate
is, the greater this difference in "probability increase" will be.
The effects of the non-negative real world constraints on PDR and retention
estimates were negligible due to the low standard deviations input into the model. The
chapter four analysis predicted 4,926 FTAP Marines using the current SRB payment
method and 5,260, 5,388, and 5,500 FTAP Marines for PDRs of 21 percent, 31 percent
and 41 percent respectively. The "averages" for the Monte Carlos simulations were
4,934, 4,947, and 4,941 FTAP Marines using the current SRB payment method during
the three runs and 5,262, 5,409, and 5,514 FTAP Marines using the lump sum payment
method with PDRs of 21 percent, 31 percent and 41 percent. These figures are
summarized in Table 16 below.
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Current Method 21 % PDR
Lump Sum
31 % PDR Lump
Sum
41 % PDR Lump
Sum
Chapter 4 Analysis 4,926 5,260 5,388 5,500






Table 16 - Comparison of Chapter Four "Range" FTAP Reenlistment Estimates vs. "Average"
Monte Carlo FTAP Reenlistment Estimates
Table 16 shows the non-negative effects of erroneously predicting greater retention are
not present in the Monte Carlo simulations.
Another notable item is that the actual FY 2000 FTAP goal is 5,799 Marines.
[Ref 30] The reason this model does not accurately reflect the achievement of this goal
using the current SRB payment method is because the Marine Corps also relies on lateral
moves from historically restricted/overstaffed Occupational Fields to "short"
occupational fields, thus historically making up the difference. These restricted
reenlistment fields are not offered a SRB. FY 2000, however, is creating more
challenges than estimated because "Marines at the end of their second and third
enlistment are departing in greater numbers than anticipated." [Ref 30]
From the Monte Carlo simulation, if one were to pick a given "goal" to reenlist of
5,800 Marines, there would be no chance of achieving this goal using the current SRB
payment method. There would be a 10 percent probability of goal achievement using a
21 percent PDR, a 22 percent probability of goal achievement using a 31 percent PDR,
and a 30 percent probability of achievement using a 4 1 percent PDR.
64
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter described the methodology this thesis used in generating Monte
Carlo simulations for predicting probability outcomes for FTAP reenlistments. The
problems associated with increasing retention forecast "averages" due to the non-negative
PDR and retention constraints were discussed. The compromise solution of limiting the
model to small standard deviation rates (0. 1 for PDRs and 0.03 for retention rates) was
determined to be the best course to follow. The outcome of the Monte Carlo simulations
demonstrated that there is an increase in probability of obtaining a given FTAP goal by
changing the SRB payment method to lump sum. Increases in the "mean" PDR increased
this probability "difference" (as would be expected) meaning that if the actual PDRs of
Marines is high, the retention benefits of changing the SRB payment method to lump sum
will be even greater.
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The Marine Corps is facing one of its greatest retention challenges in many years
in FY 2000. There are many hypothesized reasons why the Corps is witnessing so many
leaving its ranks. Military compensation, the civilian unemployment rate, higher
operation tempos, leadership, spouse job interests, life "priorities", and family stability
are but a few of the factors that manpower planners are analyzing to "solve" our
manpower shortages. The Marine Corps must not only compete with the civilian market,
but also must be dominantly more attractive due to the extra risks, pressures, and family
challenges that result from the military lifestyle. The Marine Corps must use all its tools
(exit and retention surveys, leadership, etc.) to gain an understanding of exactly "what"
the root cause of the unforeseen exodus is, and then derive a long-term plan to maintain
our National force in readiness.
One short-term retention tool used by the Marine Corps is the Selective
Reenlistment Bonus (SRB). It is used to entice additional Marines to "stay the course"
and remain in the Corps; however, it cannot solve the entire retention problem. As can be
expected, the Marine Corps has remained innovative and imaginative in its ideas. Marine
planners are working on ways of making the payment of the current SRB more visible
not only to those Marines receiving the bonus but also to other Marines who may be
eligible for a SRB in the future. They are doing this by coordinating (with the Defense
Finance and Accounting Service) a method to hand a "physical" check to the Marine at
his/her reenlistment ceremony. This ceremony is normally performed with many of the
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reenlisting Marine's peers present. Another method of making the SRB tool more
effective is by changing the payment method to lump sum.
B. PERSONAL DISCOUNT RATE
The primary research question of this thesis was to derive a reasonable forecast
for the additional Marines a lump sum SRB payment would induce to reenlist. When I
started my research and came across studies showing personal discount rates for military
enlisted personal over 10 percent, I laughed. I stated my own perceived PDR to Dr.
Mehay at somewhere around 6 percent, the going rate for certificates of deposit at Navy
Federal. However, after much time (spent in research) and thought, I have come to the
belief that PDRs among first-term Marines really are high.
The first assessment that should be made is that any commissioned officer reading
this report falls in a demographic group that values investing in the future more than it
does living for the "now." If it were not so, we never would never have invested the time
necessary to complete a college degree while forgoing making money to spend. So, my
gut feelings about what a reasonable PDR to use should not be imposed on the first-term
Marine enlisted population.
The second assessment comes from personal observation of the large number of
businesses right outside our base gates which charge exuberant interest "fees" for their
services. I have been in the Marine Corps 12 years, and yet every base I have been
stationed at has not been short of pawn shops, advance check cashing shops, and car
dealerships; all offering our Marines a method of obtaining current consumption over
future consumption and charging far more than 10 percent for their services. The
airwaves around military installations are saturated with commercial advertisements for
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these types of services several days prior to a military pay day. If PDRs were not high,
these services simply would not exist. I am fully convinced that the lower PDR of 21
percent used in my research is on the low side for the majority of first-term Marines and
that the PDR range up to 41 percent PDRs is not an unreasonable one to investigate.
C. EFFECTS OF SRB PAYMENT METHOD CHANGE
Changing the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) payment method to lump sum
will make the SRB more cost-effective and will increase first-term retention in the
targeted Occupational Fields. Both the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model and
the analysis of this thesis support this finding. The thesis estimates that the magnitude of
this increase will be between 6.8 and 1 1.7 percent additional Marines.
Although the Monte Carlo analysis was weakened by the non-negative constraints
on PDR and marginal effect retention rates (discussed in Chapter V), it also showed an
increase in the probability of obtaining a "given" number of FTAP Marines by changing
the SRB to a lump sum payment. The higher the PDR used the greater this probability
becomes. For an assumed goal of 5,800 FTAP Marines, Monte Carlos predicts the goal
cannot be achieved using the current SRB payment method. Using the lump sum SRB
payment method, the Monte Carlo simulation predicts about a 10 percent probability of
goal achievement using a 21 percent discount rate, a 22 percent probability of goal
achievement using a 3 1 percent PDR, and a 30 percent probability of goal achievement
using a 41 percent PDR.
The ACOL model was also run using personal discount rates (PDR) of 21 percent,
31 percent, and 41 percent. The ACOL model reinforced the thesis spreadsheet analysis
using CNA retention estimates in predicting an increase in retention of between 6.0
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percent and 12.9 percent. The similar predictions were not surprising as the CNA
retention analysis has many similarities with the ACOL model.
There are many uncertainties when attempting to incorporate human decisions
into an academic modeling environment and the model created for this thesis is no
exception. I would hope that the model outcomes would be somewhat accurate should
Congress change the law to enable the SRB to be paid in lump sum. However, there are
no guarantees my retention estimates will resemble the actual numbers that occur. There
is little doubt after this analysis, nonetheless, that the effects of a SRB payment method
change to lump sum will increase retention levels compared to the current SRB payment
method.
D. ASSOCIATED ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
The advantages of switching SRB payments to lump sum are that they are more
cost-efficient, more visible to Congress (dollar amounts), less limiting to decision-
makers, and less vulnerable to unintentional demographic group shaping in the military.
The major disadvantages of paying the SRB in lump sum are that it will be less visible to
the Marine over his reenlistment period, it will temporarily increase the SRB budget (for
four years) to cover both the new lump sum payments and the old method's past SRB
obligations in the same year, there is the potential for the lump sum SRB recipient to
"blow" the money foolishly, and the government may have a hard time recouping lump
sum SRBs when the service-member defaults on his/her contract.
The author believes the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages in this case.
The SRB payment may be less visible to the Marine, but the Marine will value a lump
sum payment more than he/she would the future-year payments. The SRB budget would
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increase in the short term, but after the four year period required to pay the "obligated"
SRBs, the SRB budget would be identical to today's (assuming constant dollars and
constant desired retention rates). The possibility of the Marine spending the money
foolishly does exist; however, in a country based on freedom and individual rights, I
don't think we should adopt a goal of taking care of our Marines by withholding money
due them "for their own good." Finally, the Marine Corps does pursue individuals who
default on their SRB contracts and the current reenlistment default rate is around 2
percent which is negligible. [Ref 31]
E. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The following are areas for further research applicable to this thesis:
1
.
The administration of a properly worded direct assessment method survey to a
random sample group of FTAP eligible Marines should be undertaken. This survey
would provide an estimated "current" personal discount rate for our SRB targeted group.
If possible, this survey would not only ask for normal demographic data, but also inquire
into the attitudes our Marines have toward money and the personal wealth characteristics
of our Marines and of their families. It would be of interest to compare this "survey"
PDR to the PDRs used in this analysis and those in the literature.
2. If Congress does change the SRB payment method to lump sum in the future,
it would be imperative to use the program switch as a natural experiment to study the
"actual" effects produced by the new SRB payment method.
3. The Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and analysis tool created by the author can be
made more "user friendly" for Marine manpower planners. Macro pushbuttons could be
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added and Visual Basic programming be added to enable anyone to obtain model
estimates for an unlimited number of scenarios.
4. Research should be done considering the impacts of making bonuses tax free
to the recipient. Currently, for a SRB payment of $10,000 a Marine will receive $7,500
(25 percent withholding) and thus the true "cost" to the government is not face amount of
the bonus but a switching of money from one government account to another. The
effects of a tax-free bonus should be studied.
5. Analysis tools other than Monte Carlo simulation should be used in
considering the impacts of changing the SRB payment method. For example, Logical
Decisions for Windows (LDW), a policy analysis tool, is a decision support software
program that aids in the evaluation of alternatives for any type of decision. LDW uses
measures that are either numerical or descriptive to describe the qualities of the
alternatives under consideration. LDW follows logical reasoning methods and allows the
operator to rank factors against each other to produce both quantitative and qualitative
measures of "utility." This could not only be used to assess the proposed SRB payment
method change, but also to assess the reasons for Marines choosing to leave the Marine
Corps.
F. RECOMMENDATION
On February 21, 2000, Marine Lt. General Jack Klimp (Deputy Chief of Staff for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs) stated, "Lump sum payments could dramatically
increase the present value of the "SRB" incentive and positively influence numerous
highly qualified personnel that are currently sitting on the fence." [Ref 32: p 26] This
thesis agrees. The thesis supports changing the SRB payment method to a lump sum
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payment. The federal government will be better off (Government's discount rate is 6.3
percent [Ref 20] ), the Marine Corps will be better off (more Marines will be retained for
FTAP program which ripples to other areas such as less recruiting) and the individual
Marine (with his/her high value on current consumption) will be better off. The new
policy should create net social benefits.
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APPENDIX A
Full Names of Marine Occupational Fields Analyzed in this Thesis [Ref 22]
Occ
Code Name






13 Engineer, construction, and equipment
15 Printing and reproduction
18 Tank and assault amphibious vehicle
21 Ordnance
23 Ammunition and explosive ordnance disposal
25 operational communications
26 Signal intelligence/ground electronic warfare
28 Data/communications maintenance
30 Supply administration and operations
31 Traffic management
33 Food service
34 Auditing, finance, and accounting
35 Motor transport
40 Data systems
41 Marine Corps exchange
43 Public affairs
44 Legal services
46 Training and visual information support
55 Music
57 Nuclear, biological, and chemical
58 Military police and corrections
59 Electronics maintenance
60 Aircraft maintenance - fixed wing




66 Supply (new MOS)
68 Weather service
70 Airfield services
72 Air control/air support/antiair warfare
73 Air traffic control and enlisted flight crews
9919 Information Warfare?
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